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This dissertation defines the traditional reinsurance concept, introduces the alternative risk 
transfer (ART) mechanisms and focuses on the definition and polemic of catastrophe bonds 
(CAT bonds) and finite risk reinsurance. The traditional reinsurance is a contract which aims at 
transferring the underwriting risk from a primary insurer to the reinsurer. Due to the very cyclic 
traditional reinsurance marketplace, ART techniques developed as tailored solutions to specific 
problems such as catastrophe losses. CAT bonds are an ART tool which transfers insurance 
risks from disastrous events to the capital markets at a very expensive price. Finite risk contracts 
offer the insurer a coverage on a limited amount of underwriting, investment, credit and timing 
risk, but their past bad reputation echoes today. This dissertation concludes that CAT bonds are 
increasing its popularity year over year and finite risk reinsurances must be dealt with caution.  
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Este trabajo de fin de grado que lleva por título Bonos catastróficos y el reaseguro financiero: 
Dos ARTs muy polémicas define el concepto de reaseguro tradicional, introduce los 
mecanismos de transferencia alternativa de riesgos (ART) y se centra en la definición y 
polémica de los bonos catastróficos (CAT bonds) y el reaseguro financiero o finite risk. El 
reaseguro tradicional es un contrato que transfiere el riesgo de suscripción de un asegurador 
directo al reasegurador. Debido a la gran volatilidad de precios del reaseguro tradicional, las 
técnicas ART se desarrollaron como soluciones para problemas específicos tales como 
siniestros catastróficos. Los CAT bonds son una herramienta ART que transfiere los riesgos de 
un asegurador provenientes de sucesos catastróficos a los mercados de capitales a costa de un 
alto precio para el reasegurador. Los contratos finite risk ofrecen al asegurador directo cobertura 
en una cantidad limitada de riesgo de suscripción, inversión, crédito y de tiempo; pero su mala 
reputación del pasado aún sigue recordándose. Este trabajo concluye que los CAT bonds están 
aumentando su popularidad año tras año y que los contratos finite risk deben ser tratados con 
máxima precaución, pues pueden desarrollar problemas legales que se pueden traducir en 
multas millonarias. 
 
Palabras clave: reaseguro tradicional, ART, bono catastrófico, riesgo moral, riesgo base, 
SPV, reaseguro financiero, transferencia de carteras de siniestros, paraíso fiscal, regulación 
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Insurance companies offer services that usually imply some risks that cannot be covered by their 
entire fully-owned reserves (i.e. natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods…). 
Therefore, they must seek risk protection provided by an external agent: the reinsurer. 
A reinsurance is a contract or agreement that allows an insurer (the ceding company) to 
transfer totally or partially a risk portfolio in order to reduce greater losses derived from an 
insurance claim. The aim of this dissertation is to define the traditional reinsurance, introduce 
alternative risk transfer (ART) mechanisms by reviewing its origin and their purpose and focus 
on two of them: the catastrophe bond the finite risk reinsurance contract. These two innovative 
ART forms have gained ground over the past decade and a public debate has been opened 
wide across the world on whether they are less costly than traditional reinsurance and whether 
they seek to just cover risks or also to ease financial tensions in the insurers’ balance sheets that 
can trigger some legal penalties and multimillion dollar fines.  
Through the use of a large variety of literature review going from journal articles and books to 
news, seminars and US Security and Exchange Commission government archives, this in-depth 
study is divided in four sections: an insight on traditional reinsurance, an explanation of ART 
mechanisms and an approach to catastrophe bonds and finite risk reinsurance and their 
controversy raised over the past two decades. Conclusions and recommendations can be found 
at the end of this work. 
I would like to express thanks to Antonio Ferreiro, senior manager of Property and Casualty 
Advisory at Deloitte, who in May 2017 gave a conference on ART mechanisms and blockchain 
technology at the University of Barcelona which aroused my interest on this subject to the point 
that I wanted to deepen my knowledge and capture it by writing this dissertation. I would also like 
to thank José Canalda Milà, an experienced team member of the Reinsurance Department of 
MGS Seguros y Reaseguros S.A., who introduced me for the first time the reinsurance industry 
seen from his own perspective and lent me the book Introducción al Reaseguro; and to Miquel 
Ogalla Rodríguez, manager of MGS’s claims adjuster network, who provided me with expert 
knowledge of the insurance industry marketplace and lent me another book titled Teoría General 
del Seguro. Finally, I would like to express many thanks to my dissertation tutor, Dr. Francisco 
Javier Sarrasí Vizcarra, who from the very first moment gave me the opportunity to develop this 
project, helped me to completely understand the basic concepts of the reinsurance field through 
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1. An insight on traditional reinsurance 
Based on the set of definitions that Sarrasí (2017) takes from Rückversicherung eine Einführung 
(Grossmann), the Mapfre Dictionary, the History of Reinsurance book (Golding), the German 
Commercial Code and the law firm Garrigues; a reinsurance can be defined as the contract or 
instrument whose aim is to totally or partially transfer risks from a primary insurer (the ceding 
company) to the reinsurer in order to homogenise and reduce portfolio risks so as to cut down 
losses from insurance claims and strengthen the insurer’s solvency and its credibility to meet 
future payments in the original business-to-consumer contract. Therefore, the reinsurer’s client is 
an insurer or another reinsurer; but not the general public. 
When a reinsurer agrees to transfer some risks from the primary insurer, this last one may 
accept higher than usual risks and enhance its underwriting capacity, attending customers who 
would like to contract certain types of insurances that, in other circumstances, the insurer would 
be bound to reject. The risk transfer between these two parties can be done in different ways 
and methods. 
From a legal perspective, the reinsurance can be classified as obligatory, facultative or mixed. 
The obligatory reinsurance aims the entire insurer’s portfolio or just a specific line of insurance 
making both parties bind together to accept and cede the agreed risks, guaranteeing the 
reinsurer a certain volume of premiums, reducing administrative costs (i.e. the reinsurer is 
obliged to automatically accept all those future risks taken on by the insurer if they obey the 
agreed reinsurance contract) but distancing the reinsurer from accepting those risks which go 
beyond the agreed limits of the contract. In this way, the facultative reinsurance allows both the 
ceding company and the reinsurer to freely accept an agreement on transferring an individual 
risk that may hold the same original contractual conditions between the insurer and its insured or 
not (i.e. some excluded risks or geographical zones from the obligatory reinsurance or great 
sums that exceed the limits stipulated in obligatory contracts can be individually transferred with 
a facultative contract). Finally, the mixed or obligatory-facultative contract consists of that case 
where one party (usually the reinsurer) is bound to accept, within a few limits, those individually-
selected risks that the ceding company wants to transfer in order to enhance its underwriting 
capacity with greater covered sums (Sarrasí, 2017). 
From a technical point of view, reinsurers use two main methods to offer their coverage: the 
proportional and the non-proportional reinsurance. On one hand, the proportional reinsurance 
(called this way because of the direct proportionality between ceded risks and premiums), the 
reinsurer takes a proportion of the sum insured which reveals its responsibility in case of 
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Within this method, a reinsurance commission goes to the ceding company in order to 
compensate those administrative costs it will continue to incur. Minzoni (2009) describes three 
subgroups in this method -the quota share, the surplus and the mixed reinsurance- and Sarrasí 
(2017) expresses their mathematical formalisation. In the first one, the reinsurer fixes a 
percentage on all the ceding company’s portfolio risks or just a chosen line of business to 
assume responsibility for the losses occurring during the contract period. It is easy to manage, 
saves costs and is adequate for brand-new insurers but its main disadvantage is that it does not 
homogenise the portfolio, leaving aside those top risks with the highest sums insured and ceding 
away profitable business (little losses still will cost the same premium percentage compared to 
larger ones).  
 
Quota share reinsurance mathematical formalisation 
 
S = Sc + Sr 
Sc = k · S 
Sr = (1 - k) · S 
 
X = Xc + Xr 
Xc = k · X 
Xr = (1 - k) · X 
 
Legend 
S:    Policy total sum insured 
Sc:    Policy sum insured by the ceding company 
Sr:    Policy sum reinsured by the reinsurer 
k:    Quota rate that the ceding company retains 
1 – k: Remaining quota rate taken by the reinsurer 
X:    Policy total loss 
Xc:    Policy Insured loss 
Xr:    Policy reinsured loss 
 
The second method, the surplus reinsurance, consists in fixing a retention (or a net line) on a 
policy sum insured from a certain line of insurance making the reinsurer responsible for the 
amount that exceeds that retention within the pre-established contract limits (cases that exceed 
contractual limits shall be dealt with a facultative reinsurance). Therefore, the quota rate is not 















0 < k < 1 
X ≤ S 
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which is the maximum loss quantity the insurer can assume for the policy. This method allows 
the reinsurer to limit the excessive risk and correctly homogenises its portfolio but it is more 
difficult to manage (Macedo, 2010). 
 
Surplus reinsurance mathematical formalisation 
 
S = Sc + Sr      ;       X = Xc + Xr 
Sc = k · S        ;       Xc = k · X 
 
k =                                           Sc =                                           Xc = 
 
 
Sr = k · S        ;       Xr = k · X 
 




S:    Policy total sum insured 
Sc:    Policy sum insured by the ceding company 
Sr:    Policy sum reinsured by the reinsurer 
k:    Quota rate that the ceding company retains 
1 – k: Remaining quota rate taken by the reinsurer 
M:    Ceding company’s net line 
X:    Policy total loss 
Xc:    Policy Insured loss 
Xr:    Policy reinsured loss 
 
Finally, the mixed reinsurance is a combination of the previous, operating a quota share until 
it reaches the retention and operating a surplus from then on. This type of contracts are mostly 
used when the insurer is in solid financial conditions and their advantage relies on the surplus 
coverage that offers protection and lets property portfolios grow faster (Méndez, 2005). 
On the other hand, the non-proportional reinsurance is based on fixing a maximum loss 
quantity that the ceding insurer will be able to pay leaving the reinsurer what remains, within the 
pre-established contract limits. Due to the fact this method is not ceding a proportional part of the 
primary insurer’s portfolio but just the excess-loss from the pre-established limit upwards, there 
1        if        S ≤ M 
M
S
        if        S ˃ M 
M        if        S ˃ M M
S
· X        if        S ˃ M 
X              if        S ≤ M S        if         S ≤ M 




   if    S ˃ M 
S – M   if      S ˃ M 
0        if        S ≤ M 
S – M
S
· X    if     S ˃ M 
0              if        S ≤ M 
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is no sense to talk about a reinsurance commission as it does not apply (Minzoni, 2009). 
According to Macedo (2010), two types of non-proportional contracts can be distinguished: the 
excess-loss (and its Cat XL or Catastrophe version) and the stop-loss. The first one covers the 
insurer from those losses that go over the limit or “priority” established by the ceding company. 
The Cat XL version focuses on the sum of the losses occurred by one identical incident (for 
example, an earthquake) and establishes the priority on this sum. Finally, in the stop-loss 
reinsurance the primary insurer fixes a percentage on the total loss that it is able to absorb for a 
specific line of business in an entire fiscal year (Alegre et al., 2017), leaving what remains to the 
reinsurer (for example, if the loss ratio priority is 110% and the actual loss ratio has been 130%, 
the reinsurer will pay those 20 points above the priority). 
 
Excess-loss reinsurance mathematical formalisation 
  




X:    Claim amount of a policy 
Xc:    Policy insured loss 
Xr:    Policy reinsured loss 
M:    Priority 
 
Stop-loss reinsurance mathematical formalisation 
 




Z:    Total portfolio loss of a specific line of business in an entire fiscal year 
Zc:    Total insured loss 
Zr:    Total reinsured loss 




M        if        X ≥ M X – M        if        X ≥ M 
X        if         X ˂ M 0        if         X ˂ M 
M        if        Z ≥ M Z – M        if        Z ≥ M 
Z        if         Z ˂ M 0        if         Z ˂ M 
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The traditional reinsurance encompasses all these types of contracts and usually lasts a year. 
It can be prospective (covers future losses) or retrospective (covers losses that already 
occurred) and it only takes into account the underwriting risk. When investment risk and timing 
risk are added to the reinsurance designing, it comes up the financial reinsurance, an alternative 
risk transfer which is gaining ground over the past few years. Taking into account the moment of 
time the insurance claims must be paid and the interest rates of the financial returns, the 
mathematical formalization of the financial reinsurance would be: 
 
Zc =       c,i   c (Ti,0)            Zr =       r,i   r (Ti,0) 
 
Legend 
Zc Total insured loss 
Zr Total reinsured loss 
N: Number of losses occurring in the interval [0, t] 
Ti: Moment of the ith loss payment in years 
Xc,i: Insured loss at the ith accident 
Xr,i: Reinsured loss at the ith accident 
𝑓c (Ti,0) Ceding company’s discount factor. The interest rate is based on the financial returns that 
the ceding company obtains from the retained premium. 
𝑓r (Ti,0) Reinsurer’s discount factor. The interest rate is based on the financial returns that the 




   𝑓 ∑ 𝑋
𝑁
𝑖=1
    𝑓 (X1, X2,…, XN, T1, T2,..., TN, N) 
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2. Alternative risk transfer mechanisms 
2.1 Origin 
When traditional reinsurance cover becomes expensive due to new emerging risks such as 
cyber, terrorism and liability risks that change the insurance prices over the course of the cycles, 
alternative risk transfer (ART) mechanisms appear as an innovative opportunity of cost effective 
techniques ready to be seized (Sibindi, 2015a). 
The very first time an ART form came up in the market was in the 1960s when organisations 
began to fully focus on risk management designing systems for loss prevention (Dionne, 2013; 
Giddy, 2006; Doherty, 2000) such as captive insurance companies and risk retention groups 
(Schanz, 1999). Captives are self-insurance programs developed in order to reduce transactions 
costs from the insurance industry (caused by adverse selection, moral hazard, credit risk, basis 
risk, etc) and to obtain more investment control of premiums (Dionne, 2013). If located in 
offshore domiciles, they can have tremendous tax-advantages. In 2012, the world's three largest 
captive domiciles were Bermuda with 856 captives, the Cayman Islands with 741 and Vermont 
with 586 (Zolkos, 2013). According to Dionne (2013), “risk retention groups (RRG) are a special 
type of group captive authorized by Congress in response to the liability insurance crisis of the 
1980s to provide additional liability insurance capacity to businesses”. They account for only a 
small proportion of the US liability market and their main lines of insurance are liability coverage 
for professionals, the healthcare industry and educational institutions. 
According to Ostaszewski (2006), the field of ART grew out when insurance capacity was not 
sufficient and in the 1970s through 1990s insurers were driven from looking for traditional 
coverage to seek alternative ways to buy protection. Most of these techniques permit investors in 
the capital markets to take a more direct role in providing insurance and reinsurance protection, 
hence bringing up a convergence of insurance and financial markets. An ART form which 
reduces moral hazard and passes the risk to the financial market is through securitization such 
as reinsurance sidecars (financial structures that allow external market investors to take on the 
risk and benefit from the return of specific insurance or reinsurance active business), swaps and 
catastrophe bonds. Catastrophe bonds, linked to a catastrophic-loss index, are insurance-linked 
securities that appeared first in 1992 on the Chicago Board of Trade ready to be launched 
(Dionne, 2013; Minzoni, 2009). Later on, this article gives a complete explanation of them and 
their controversy. 
Some key market participants in ART operations are investment banks such as Goldman 
Sachs and Citibank, insurers such as AIG, Zurich and XL, reinsurers such as Munich Re, 
Hannover Re, Swiss Re, brokers like AON, Willis Towers Watson or Marsh and consultants such 
as Deloitte and ABS Consulting (Ostaszewski, 2006). Ultimately, the alternative risk transfer 
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market has grown an average of 6% per year since the mid-1980s, about twice the growth rate 
in the commercial insurance market (Andre and Sodowsky, 1997). 
 
2.2 Definition and purpose of the ART mechanisms 
Recently, ART has acquired a broader meaning and blends risk retention and risk transfer at the 
lowest total cost of risk resulting in mutually aligning the financial interests of both the insurer 
and the insured (Giddy, 2006). Today, there exist two broad segments to the ART market: risk 
transfer through alternative carriers, such as self-insurance, pools, captives and RRGs; and risk 
transfer through alternative products such as insurance-linked securities or CAT (catastrophe) 
bonds, credit securitization, committed capital, weather derivatives and finite risk products. 
Schanz (1999) describes ART mechanisms as tailored solutions to specific problems, multi-year 
and multi-line cover, a diversification and spread of risk over time that allows to insure those 
traditionally uninsurable risks and, finally, a way to transfer to risk to non-(re)insurers (to 
investors in stock markets). Dionne (2013) states that reinsurance prices are highly volatile over 
the course of the cycle especially for reinsuring catastrophic losses. Rohe et al. (1998) also 
explains ART activity has developed in the property and casualty industry because of the very 
cyclic reinsurance marketplace. When a large event occurs, capacity dries up and makes pricing 
more expensive. Later, as time goes by and capacity recovers, reinsurance pricing becomes 
more competitive again. Graph 1 represents the rate on line index evolution year over year as 
historical events occurred, considering 1990 as the base year. As stated by the International 
Risk Management Institute, the rate on line is the ratio or percentage derived by dividing the 
reinsurance premium by the reinsurance limit or loss recoverable and the inverse is known as 
the payback period. The higher rate on line, the higher reinsurance premium to be paid. In 1992, 
Hurricane Andrew wiped out Florida escalating the insured losses to astronomical levels, larger 
than any model had predicted before. The industry experienced losses of $26 billion (Artemis, 
2015; Gonzalez and Sparrow, 2012) and the models had predicted that a bad hurricane would 
cause $2 billion in claims. As everyone was reconsidering their pricing strategy, reinsurance 
rates became more expensive and insurance companies realized that they needed much more 
coverage than they ever thought about (Rohe et al., 1998). Later, as time passed reinsurance 
prices became more competitive until another big event took place (i.e. 9/11 terror attacks, 
Hurricane Katrina, 2011 Japan Earthquake, Hurricane Sandy…) which would trigger another big 
increase in the rate on line index making reinsurance premiums more expensive and thereby 
strengthening the cyclic feature of the reinsurance pricing. 
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Alternative risk transfer methods such as CAT bonds or Finite Risk reinsurance can provide 
this capital coverage without these traditional reinsurance pricing market fluctuations that make it 
difficult for insurers to satisfy their capacity needs and also to reinsurers who do not offer 
coverage due to lack of capacity and risk-layering (Rohe et al., 1998). Nevertheless, Sibindi 
(2015b) concludes in his study that ART techniques “must be understood as compliments rather 
than substitutes to traditional insurance products” and the underlying reason for this argument 
could be their complexity and controversy.
Graph 1. Global property catastrophe rate-on-line index evolution.










































3. Catastrophe bonds 
3.1 Definition and purpose 
Over more than 15 years, catastrophe bonds or CAT bonds have served as a means to transfer 
insurance risks from events such as hurricanes, earthquakes and floods from insurers, 
reinsurers and other corporations to institutional and retail investors in the capital markets. The 
mechanism consists of a bond whose principal and coupons, designed with a Libor, Euribor or 
Treasury benchmarked spread, may be lost if a significant pre-defined event occurs (Ng, 2012). 
However, (Rohe et al., 1998) explains there exist CAT bonds that act like a zero-coupon bond in 
the event of a catastrophe where coupons are lost but the principal remains safe. This is 
possible because of the assembly of a bond defeasance or a provision in which the borrower 
sets some of the proceeds aside (in a protected account) to pay off the principal over an 
extended period of time if the catastrophe did finally occur (Saint-Leger, 2011; Ostaszewski, 
2006). Due to fears of losing the principal for disastrous events, investors such as life insurers or 
pension funds were to make catastrophe securitisation look unfeasible and illiquid. The first 
successful deal with these “defeased” CAT bonds was what Mr. Egan from Rohe et al. (1998) 
calls the St. Paul Re bond in 1996 and involved a five-year deal that covered existing exposure 
and new business to be written in the future. Part of the bond was invested in zero-coupon 
Treasury bills to guarantee the payment of the principal, thus not putting it at risk. The St. Paul 
Re deal was sold to US institutional investors such as Winterthur, which issued a three-year 
convertible bond -into Winterthur’s equity- where interests were at risk for adverse European 
hailstorm losses. Winterthur bonds were sold to retail investors, beginning the first insurance 
securitisation. Later, in 1997, USAA could successfully issue a $500 million deal containing the 
defeasance clause. Next, Swiss Re launched its Swiss Re Earthquake Fund which covered 
California earthquake exposure and it had only a partial defeasance element, so not all of the 
principal was protected. Finally, Tokyo Marine did a transaction called Parametric Re which 
covered the perils of a Japanese earthquake. The CAT bond evolution had to be this way 
because before the St. Paul deal, USAA failed to do a $500 million transaction as investors were 
not keen on losing both the principal and coupons in case of a massive loss triggered by a single 
windstorm event on the East Coast. 
Nowadays, catastrophe bond and insurance-linked securities (ILS) issuance are breaking 
records year over year since the first quarter (Q1) of 2014 (Evans, 2018a). Graph 2 shows that 
in 2018 Q1 approximately $4.24 billion of new risk capital was brought to market from 23 
tranches of notes via 17 deals, being the first time that Q1 issuance surpasses $4 billion and 
keeping an upward trend since 2009 Q1; and the average transaction size in 2018 Q1 was 
approximately $249 million across 17 deals, which is above the ten-year average size of $187 
 






million, and eight above the average number of transactions completed, making it the most 
active Q1 ever (see Graph 3). 
 
 
CAT bonds were firstly developed to offset the decrease in insurance capacity in response to 
the lack of wind coverage when Hurricane Andrew took place and their utilisation had been 
modest at the start even though transactional costs were declining and their acceptance was 
increasing (Indiviglio, 2011; Giddy, 2006). The main buyers of CAT bonds are life insurers, 
money managers, mutual funds, investment banks and hedge funds and their maturities range 
from one to three years (Wiedmeyer, 2012; Rohe et al., 1998). Although some authors argue 
that this ART form should be embraced as it is a cost effective technique (Sibindi, 2015a; Giddy 
CAT bond and ILS issuance Trend
Graph 2. 2018 Q1 ILS issuance by year ($M).












Graph 3. 2018 Q1 ILS average transaction size & number of transactions by year ($M).



















2006) which is uncorrelated with other asset classes, it is good to achieve diversification even 
though its typical below-investment-grade rating (Ostaszewski, 2006), there is a variety of perils 
to be covered (Ng, 2012), it has no credit risk (Dionne, 2013) and very attractive yields; Doherty 
(1997) argues that CAT bonds are not necessarily cheaper for reinsurers than traditional 
reinsurance. 
 
3.2 Controversy over CAT bonds 
There exist a public debate on whether CAT bonds are really a good coverage alternative or 
instead are just a simple financial instrument meant to enrich investors who buy them. For 
example, Indiviglio (2011) argues that despite the number of significant natural disasters 
occurred, for instance earthquakes and the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, these bonds 
have performed better than other asset classes because of their specific designing criteria which 
aims to protect investors from paying reinsurers. For example, as 2011 Japan’s earthquake was 
more than 70 miles away from Tokyo, CAT bond investors would only had to pay less than 10 
percent of the $1.7 billion of debt sold to help cover losses. Keogh et al. (2011), from Bloomberg, 
states CAT bonds could have ended up unscathed after Japan’s worst earthquake 
“outperforming stocks, commodities, junk-rated debt and the reinsurers they’re meant to protect”. 
In this type of securitised contract, both the advantages and disadvantages are related to 
basis risk and moral hazard (Dionne, 2013), two concepts where one is the flip side of the other 
(Doherty, 1997) or, in other words, they are inversely related (Ostaszewski, 2006). Gorvett 
(1999) explains these two concepts. On one hand, basis risk appears when the reinsurer who 
issued CAT bonds is experiencing bigger losses than the industry as a whole, that is, the debt 
relief provided by the bond (which depends on an industry catastrophe experience and consists 
in forgiving the insurer to pay back part of the principal and/or interests) will not be enough to 
offset its own losses, thus, mismatching the hedge. On the other hand, moral hazard may occur 
when due to a catastrophe loss meeting the CAT bond criteria, the company experiences a 
decrease in debt obligations (principal and/or interests are not bound to be given back) and 
seizes the opportunity to act unfaithfully and inflate its losses in order to be relieved from bigger 
debts and improve its financial rating to obtain better financing conditions at the expense of CAT 
bond investors. 
The reinsurance indemnity can be triggered by parametric triggers that Gorvett (1999) defines 
as three types: Direct, Industry and Event. The “Direct” trigger means the payoff of the CAT bond 
is based on just the company’s losses, so basis risk does not exist. On the contrary, the 
“Industry” parametric trigger has basis risk as it depends on how the index of insurance industry 
losses performed but it does not have a significant amount of moral hazard. In the 1990s, a lot of 
insurers were not interested in an indexed transaction because they were afraid their loss 
 






experience could be higher than index, thus, they feared basis risk (Rohe et al., 1998). Finally, 
the “Event” trigger depends on the magnitude of a pre-defined disaster (e.g., Richter scale for 
earthquakes), its location and the occurrence. If the event does not occur, there is no payoff. 
This implies some basis risk. 
Aside from the risks carried by these insurance-linked securities, another downside to these 
insurance-linked securities is its liquidity, which is affected by the size of the deal and depends 
on whether investment banks want to place these bonds into the market as they only want to do 
it with deals they get involve (Rohe et al., 1998). Besides, investment banks charge reinsurers 
advising fees and spreads between the prices at which they purchase issues and the prices at 
which they sell them to the capital markets. Other costs of the CAT bond issuance are the high 
yields which consists of the LIBOR plus spreads over it ranging from 500 bps to 1500 bps 
(Dionne, 2013; Wiedmeyer, 2012; Ostaszewski, 2006), legal fees and the setting up of a special 
purpose vehicle (captive) or SPV. 
According to Gorvett (1999), the issuance structure of this ART mechanism implies setting up 
an SPV to intermediate between the company and the capital markets. This SPV, which is 
typically an offshore reinsurer domiciled in the Cayman Islands, Bermuda or Ireland 
(Ostaszewski, 2006), aims to maintain favourable tax and accounting treatments. Figure 4 
shows how the CAT bond issuance works (Evans, 2018b; Wiedmeyer, 2012). The Sponsor or 
the reinsurance company creates an SPV which issues individual bond notes to capital markets 
investors. The money contributed by investors is then deposited in a collateral trust or collateral 
account owned by the SPV (not the original sponsor, hence the favourable accounting 
treatments) whose goal is to invest it in low-risk highly-rated securities, such as U.S. treasuries 
among other permitted investments. Finally, the coupon paid to investors is made up from the 
investment return the SPV achieves from the collateral trust and the premiums the sponsor pays. 
If an event meeting the trigger conditions to activate a payout occurs, the SPV will use those 
cash flows coming from the invested premiums and from the invested bond proceeds to pay the 
sponsor while it stops paying coupons to investors and retaining their principal in case of no 
“defeasance” clause in the CAT bond. If that event does not occur, the principal is returned at 
maturity date. 
 








To sum up, not only risks and high yields make the CAT bond an expensive ART but insurers 
begin to realise they seek for protection from events that have a 1% probability to occur at a very 
high cost (Wiedmeyer, 2012; Indiviglio, 2011). Nevertheless, insurers are interested in sharing 
risks in other to smooth annual results as well (Dionne, 2013). Another type of ART mechanism 
is the finite risk reinsurance, which has raised a public debate on whether it really is a form to 
tackle risks or it just conceals the ceding company’s losses and pretties up its financial 
statements to such a degree that it might cross some legal boundaries (Wiggins, 2004; Álvarez, 
1995). 
Figure 4. Catastrophe bond issuance structure. 
Source: Artemis.bm (Evans, 2018b), Wiedmeyer (2012)
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4. Finite risk reinsurance 
4.1 Definition and purpose 
Appearing in 1960s’ insurance marketplace and peaking its popularity in the late 1990s 
(Wiggins, 2004), finite risk reinsurance is one of the several ART tools companies use to 
increase their capacity and transfer high risks when natural disasters and traditional insurance 
losses escalate in times of uncertainty (Minzoni, 2009; Zolkos, 2003). 
Contrary to traditional reinsurance, as Table 5 shows, finite risk transactions can be defined 
as multi-line, multiyear contracts where the reinsurer offers the insurer a coverage on a limited 
amount of risk relative to the aggregated premiums (Dahlen, 2007). This coverage extends to 
investment risk (i.e. real investment return resulting lower than expected), credit risk (i.e. the 
ceding company cannot pay the reinsurer the premiums), underwriting risk (uncertainty on the 
final cost of an insurance claim) and timing risk, which is the uncertainty on the period of time 
where the insurance claims must be paid off (Minzoni, 2009; Méndez, 2005). These contracts 
are based on assembling an account or fund, called experience fund, in which the reinsurance 
premium, which takes into account interest rates, is put in there as well as its investment return 
and as time goes by, insurance claims and administrative costs from the reinsurer are paid off 
through the experience fund (Sarrasí, 2017). At the end of the contract, in case there is a 
positive balance in the fund (i.e. because the reinsurer has obtained an investment return higher 
than expected), the reinsurer usually gives back 100% of the remaining amount.  
 
Table 5. Differences between finite risk and traditional reinsurance 
Traditional reinsurance Finite risk reinsurance 
Annual and single line contracts Multiyear and multiline contracts 
Does not take into account interest rates to 
calculate the reinsurance premium 
Takes into account interest rates to calculate 
the reinsurance premium. 
Premium is pre-fixed and is not returned 
Premium is usually returned if there are no 
losses 
Covers underwriting risk 
Covers underwriting, investment, credit and 
timing risk 
No experience fund There is an experience fund 
Combination of risks Risks treated individually during a few years 
Limited lines of business covered 
Covers lines of business that traditional 
reinsurance cannot 
Focuses on the risk transfer and reducing 
underwriting risk 
Focuses on obtaining an investment return, 
managing liquidity and long-term planning 
 
Source: Sarrasí (2007), Álvarez (1995) 
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Finite structures can be prospective (deals with future losses), taking the forms of spread loss 
cover and financial quota share, or retrospective (deals with past losses that have already 
occurred), in which time and distance policy, loss portfolio transfer (LPT) and adverse 
development cover (ADC) can be distinguished as the most relevant actual retrospective forms 
(Minzoni, 2009; Sarrasí, 2007; Greig, 2005). 
The spread loss cover is a prospective contract that affects an entire risk portfolio and is 
based on spreading losses over several earnings reporting periods in exchange of the ceding 
premium which is put in an experience fund to obtain investment return (Minzoni, 2009; Álvarez, 
1995). It provides financing, liquidity management and long-term planning. 
The financial quota share is another prospective contract where the reinsurer agrees to take a 
percentage of the cedent’s premiums, which is the potential loss limit the reinsurer is going to be 
liable to, in exchange for a ceding commission that enables the cedent to increase its writing 
capacity as it arises surplus relief from transferring a portion of its risk to the reinsurer (Greig, 
2005). 
The time and distance policy is a retrospective contract where the reinsurer guarantees the 
cedent specific payments at pre-established future periods of time which are funded with the 
initial cedent’s premium and the return on capital the reinsurer expects from its investments, 
therefore, timing risk could be a threat in this case (Minzoni, 2009). 
The loss portfolio transfer (LPT) is a retrospective reinsurance transaction in which cedent’s 
loss obligations are partially or totally transferred to the reinsurer (Partlow, 2012; Minzoni, 2009). 
When the deal includes known and unknown claims or IBNRs (Incurred But Not Reported), it is 
known as an Adverse Development Cover (ADC) which works like a stop-loss (Sarrasí, 2007). 
Figure 6 shows the ADC can take the form of “at-the-money” cover, making the reinsurer 
assume the excess loss above a fixed limit on the cedent’s net reserves; “excess” cover, fixing a 
limit plus a retention on the cedent’s net reserves; or “hybrid options”, attaching cover within net 
reserves with the possibility to incorporate additional retentions or loss corridors (Mounty, 2016). 
Figure 6. Types of ADC covers 
 
Source: Willis Towers Watson (Mounty, 2016) 
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In order to calculate the premium for the LPT contracts to the reinsurer, the time value of 
money is considered making the premium less than the ultimate amount expected to be paid 
(Palmer et al., 2015; Koegel, 2003). The LPT contracts, designated by Giddy (2006) as the most 
used finite product, can be used to exit a line of business, to transfer risk, to eliminate long-term 
liabilities from a company during merger and acquisition activities or transfer historical losses of 
the parent company to a captive where tax advantages appear in the form of deductible 
reimbursement programs, making the LPT formal legal transaction require sometimes the 
approval from the regulator and triggering a public debate on whether the finite risk scheme 
purpose is to transfer risk or to keep a company afloat by “making-up” its balance sheet losses 
(Zolkos, 2003; Quane et al., 2002). 
 
4.2 Controversy over finite risk reinsurance 
In 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy with an aggregate asset value of $65.5 billion due to the 
scandal it got involved with its fraudulent accounting practices (Howe, 2011). Finite risk 
reinsurance began to be highly repudiated by companies as Enron used it as a means to 
conceal financial problems and reduce balance sheet volatility while involving almost no actual 
risk transfer (Zolkos, 2002). As reported by Minzoni (2009), finite risk deals were firstly meant to 
distort balance sheet accounts until new stricter regulatory rules came up. Either way, this ART 
product helps the buyer to reduce their cost of capital while spreading losses over different 
earnings reporting periods in order to publish steady profits on their annual reports, thereby, 
“smoothing earnings” to satisfy shareholders (Giddy, 2006; Wiggins, 2004; Zolkos, 2003). In the 
past, the finite risk used to be sold by reinsurers to insurers but also by insurers to non-financial 
clients, such as the Enron case (Wiggins, 2004). Due to the later Enron scandal and AIG settling 
with US Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) over allegations that through a finite product 
the cell phone distributor Brightpoint concealed $11.9 million of losses (Carlin and Schonfeld, 
2003), finite risk products were seen as something negative that hurt firms’ reputation and 
transparency (Wiggins, 2004; Wojcik, 2004; Zolkos, 2003). But Enron scandal also affected its 
auditor, Arthur Andersen, who according to Walker et al. (2001) agreed to settlement “resulting 
in first antifraud injunction in more than 20 years and largest-ever civil penalty ($7 million) in SEC 
enforcement action against a Big Five accounting firm”. Consequently, auditors began to look 
more carefully if a finite risk product was misused and purposed to distort or smooth financial 
accounts because if that were the case, it would not be condoned (Zolkos, 2003). 
At the beginning, it was difficult to put the finite risk reinsurance in a legal framework as there 
was no regulation on the reinsurer insolvency, the aggregate limit in case of high losses, tax 
evasion, unfair competition (i.e. banks credit-and-corporate-loan business could be threatened 
by finite deals) and the accounting method which could vary depending on the type of risk 
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(Álvarez, 1995). The measures taken by some countries to overcome finite risk abuses are 
mainly focused on the actual risk transfer and the accounting system for finite risk transactions 
(Culp and Heaton, 2005; Álvarez, 1995). In the US, the Financial Accounting Standard Board 
(FASB) considers the existence of risk transfer as crucial for the transaction to be accounted as 
an insurance contract, otherwise, if there is little or no risk then the transaction translates into a 
deposit, credit or loan which must be accounted as such, losing the financial advantages of 
accounting it as a part of the reserves generated by the financial reinsurance. UK acts similarly 
to the US with its public organisms such as “Statement of recommended Practice” (SORP) or the 
“Accounting Standards Committee” (ASC). As stated by Zolkos (2002), UK and Australia are 
carefully inspecting how finite risk and other structured products hide failing insurance 
companies’ financial problems. Tax discounts via accounting finite risk transactions as loss 
reserves are prohibited in France, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden. From an international 
point of view, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) works to achieve full 
transparency and disclosure over the finite reinsurance-related risk transfer to avoid favourable 
accounting treatments within cases of abuse and to regulate and supervise the finite reinsurance 
marketplace (Dahlen, 2007). 
Last but not least, reinsurers tend to establish their operations in offshore countries (Cayman 
Islands, Bermuda, etc) where tax evasion is favourable mainly through their special purpose 
vehicles (SPV) or captives which lack of transparency in most of their lines of business such as 
personal, commercial, life insurance and property and casualty and deteriorate their trust and 

























The present dissertation has defined the traditional reinsurance concept out of words and 
mathematical expressions. It has also introduced the alternative risk transfer (ART) mechanisms 
and has broken down the catastrophe bond and finite risk reinsurance concepts and their 
controversy. Even though traditional reinsurance pricing is volatile due to its variations in 
capacity when a large event takes place, the ART techniques seem to be still acting as 
complements rather than substitutes. This is due to their complexity and distrust. 
On one hand, catastrophe bonds do not seem to be less costly than traditional reinsurance 
because their assembling through special purpose vehicles is quite expensive and their 
contractual conditions are very strict, as it has been proven that when a disaster such an 
earthquake or a hurricane occurs this ART mechanism fails to cover a big part of the insured 
losses because the contractual conditions for the bond to be triggered are not met. In addition, 
the probability for such event to occur is 1%, what makes investors have 99% chance of 
receiving their principal and coupons (usually with high yield rates) intact. 
On the other hand, finite risk contracts cannot be defined as less costly than traditional 
reinsurance yet due to their high controversy that exist around them. Since their establishment in 
the reinsurance marketplace, these deals have faced legal penalties, some of them prosecuted 
by the US Security and Exchange Commission accompanied by multimillion dollar fines. Part of 
their questionable features are their tax advantages from being produced in offshore locations 
and their multiyear character which implies smoothing losses over several earnings periods at 
risk is transferred. As a result of abuses and misuses of this ART technique and past accounting 
scandals such as Enron’s, defenders and critics have gotten involved in a long dispute over its 
legitimacy and continuity. 
To sum up, the increasing popularity trend of catastrophe bonds is confirmed over time. 
Besides, they do not represent a direct threat for reinsurers, insurers or policyholders as the risk 
is widespread in the financial markets. However, further research and investigation on finite risk 
transactions throughout the world would be needed to figure out what countries are buying finite 
risk policies, who gets the most profit of it and how governments regulate and supervise this 
marketplace because most of the authors consulted in this dissertation agree that without 
transparency and disclosure of finite risk reinsurance products (specially the most popular form 
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